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their own bootstraps. The effect of the decision denuded of its
legal aspects is somewhat unfortunate, however, as its direct
result is to determine the destructibility or indestructibility of a
testamentary trust according to the ability or inability of the
person threatening its destruction to bring himself within a class,
the members of which might accomplish that purpose. The
result is that the remedies of a beneficiary depend upon circumstances wholly fortuitous and under such circumstances it is
debatable whether public policy would not be better served by
permitting the living under the guidance of a court of equity
to allocate in a manner most productive of the common good
wealth which the dead have bestowed grudgingly and with
res'ervations. Cases which seem contrary to the case under
discussion have their basis in statutes declaring that policy."
It is submitted that the enactment of a statute which would
permit the adjustment of the rights of beneficiaries under long
term trusts to suit the needs of the beneficiaries and the economic
changes during the period of the trust would be beneficial for
many reasons only a few of which have been discussed in this
GEORGE E. FEE.

paper.

A SUPREME COURT OPINION CONTRADICTING

THE

SCINTILLA RULE

The opinion of the supreme court in Cleveland Railway Co. v.
Kukucz' cannot logically co-exist with the scintilla rule and,
therefore, imperatively requires a re-examination of that troublesome doctrine and a deliberate choice between it and the case
referred to.
1
°The case of Wolf v. Uhlemann 325 111, 165, 145 N. E. 334 (1927), Which
seems to accomplish the result contended for on behalf of the beneficiaries in
the instant case rests upon the fact that the property which was the subject of
the agreement was in reality intestate property because of the provision of the
Illinois statute against the accumulation of income. ILL. Rev. STAT., c. 30,
sec. 153, p. 636. Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 194 N. W. 1008 (1923).
While seemingly at variance with the instant casc may be explained by the
provisions of the Michigan Statutes. See Act of August 18, 1921. See In re
Lacroix's Estate, 244 Mich. 148, 221 N. W. 165 (1928), justifying an agreement
of settlement which invalidated a will by a consent verdict. See Shermann v.
Warren, 211 Mass. 288, and MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921), c. 204, sec. 15.
1121 Ohio St. 468, 169 N. E. 564 (1929).

WITH THE 01110 COURTS-EDITORIAL NOTES

The plaintiff in the Kukucz case sought damages for injuries
claimed to have resulted from the defendant's negligence. The
latter denied the allegations of negligence and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff directly contributing to the injuries in question. At the close of the plaintiff's
evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict. This
motion was overruled and the defendant thereupon went forward
with its proof, calling numerous witnesses. At the close of all
the evidence the defendant again moved for a directed verdict
and this motion was granted. The plaintiff prosecuted error to
the court of appeals, which reversed the trial court "for error in
directing the verdict". The supreme court reversed the court
of appeals and affirmed the trial court, saying:
"The record discloses that both parties offered evidence, but
that the evidence offered by the defendant was not incorporated
in the bill. The motion of the defendant for a directed verdict
was made and sustained at the close of the evidence. What
the proof offered by the defendant was, whether it countervailed the proof of plaintiff on the issue of negligence, or sustained
its issue of contributory negligence, neither the Court of Appeals
nor this Court has the means of knowing. The missing evidence
may have fully sustained the Court's ruling in directing the
verdict."
All of the members of the supreme court concurred in the
opinion except Judge Robinson who did not participate.
It will be observed that the supreme court did not reverse the
court of appeals because the plaintiff's own evidence entitled the
defendant to a directed verdict, but reversed on the sole ground
that the defendant's evidence, which was missing from the bill
of exceptions, may have fully sustained the trial court's ruling.
The clearest principles of logic compel the conclusion that the
supreme court must have considered that the plaintiff had made
at least a primafacie case, for if the court had been of the opinion
that the plaintiff's evidence did not raise even a scintilla, the
natural and reasonable and customary procedure would have
been to reverse the court of appeals and affirm the trial court
on that ground. If the plaintiff had not introduced "some evidence" there was no occasion to rest the decision upon the absence
of defendant's evidence from the bill of exceptions. But the
supreme court held that it could not pass on the propriety of the
directed verdict because the defendant's evidence was not in-
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corporated in the bill. The only rational inference is that the
plaintiff's evidence was, in itself, sufficient to require submission
to the jury.
Indeed, we are not left to inference, however compelling. The
court has stated its position with great clarity:
"What the proof offered by the defendant was, whether it
countervailed the proof of plaintiff on the issue of negligence, or
sustained its issue of contributory negligence, neither the Court
of Appeals nor this Court has the means of knowing. The missing
evidence may have fully sustained the trial court's ruling in directing
the verdict." (Italics ours.)
Unless the plaintiff's evidence had raised at least a scintilla
there was nothing to countervail, and no occasion to inquire
whether the issue of contributory negligence had been sustained.
It follows necessarily that the plaintiff must have introduced
"some evidence". There is simply no escape from that conclusion.
In this connection it is pertinent to observe that in two previous
trials the plaintiff had obtained a verdict from the jury. One
of these verdicts was set aside by the trial court as being against
the weight of the evidence, indicating that he, too, considered that
the plaintiff had introduced "some evidence", 2 for if there had not
been at least a scintilla there was, beyond question, nothing to
weigh. In another trial the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant upon which judgment was entered. This was reversed and the case remanded by the court of appeals "for error
in the charge of the court, no other error appearing in the record".
It would seem, therefore, that the court of appeals considered
that the plaintiff had introduced "sonic evidence"-otherwise
(1) the error in the charge could not have been the only error, and
(2) in any event the plaintiff could not have been prejudiced by
the charge, no matter how erroneous.
'His written opinion concluded as follows:
"All in all, the Court cannot reconcile this verdict with the weight of the
evidence. The Court, however, does want the entry in the ease to affirmatively
show that the ground for sustaining the motion for a new trial is that the
verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, so that plaintiff's
right may be protected under the statute in the event that the case is again
tried and goes to a verdict in his behalf."

WITH THE 01110 COURTS-EDITORIAL NOTES

Thus, before the case reached the supreme court, a common
pleas judge had found and the court of appeals had twice found
that the plaintiff was entitled to determination by a jury of the
issues presented, and two juries had returned verdicts in his
favor, all of which agrees with the only conclusion which can
rationally be drawn from the opinion of the supreme court,
namely, that the plaintiff had introduced at least a scintilla of
evidence.
How, then, could it possibly make any difference, under the
scintilla rule, what the defendant's evidence was?3 Yet the
supreme court held that, in the absence of the defendant's evidence,
it could do nothing but reverse the court of appeals and affirm the
trial court. The utter antithesis between that and the scintilla
rule cannot be escaped. Like crabbed age and youth, they
cannot live together.
3

1n the Kukucz case the bill of exceptions shows only that "numerous
witnesses were called in behalf of the defendant". It is therefore possible to
argue as follows: So far as appears from the bill of exceptions the defendant
may have called the plaintiff as its own witness. If the defendant did call the
plaintiff as its own witness, the plaintiff's testimony, given by him as a part
of the defendant's case, may have contained admissions requiring a directed
verdict for the defendant. Therefore, since every presumption must be
indulged in favor of a judgment, the supreme court not only properly sustained
the trial court in directing a verdict, but its holding cannot be said to conflict
with the scintilla rule for the reason that, a party being bound by his-own
testimony, a directed verdict against the plaintiff on the basis of his statements
as a witness for the defendant, is entirely outside the scope of the scintilla rule.
Abstractly the foregoing argument is sound. It loses all force, however,
when subjected to a little scrutiny in the light of experience.
If the defendant in, the Kukucz case called the plaintiff to disprove his own
(plaintiff's) allegations of negligence on the part of the defendant, or to prove
its (defendant's) allegations of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it was certainly a most extraordinary proceeding. No competent trial
lawyer would have thought of doing such a thing. The plaintiff testified in
his own behalf and all that the defendant could hope to get from him was
available on cross-examination; and the plaintiff was, in fact, cross-examined
at length. Therefore, while, in theory, the defendant may have called the
plaintiff as its witness, nevertheless it is a moral certainty that the defendant
actually did no such foolish thing.
If the supreme court, in deciding as it did, had in mind the argument under
discussion, it was flying in the face of reality. In the absence of a statement
by the court to that effect, we cannot suppose that it took so extravagant a
position. If it considered this aspect of the matter at all (and there is nothing
to indicate that it did), the court must certainly have taken judicial notice of
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As stated in the leading case of Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life
Insurance & Trust Company,4 the scintilla rule is as follows:
"Wherever there is any evidence, however slight, tending to
prove the facts essential to make out a case for the plaintiff, a
non-suit cannot be properly ordered; it is in no case a question
as to the weight, but as to the relevancy of the testimony."
If that be the law the directed verdict in the Kukucz case is
simply unthinkable. Yet the supreme court reversed the court
of appeals and affirmed the trial court. What then is the law?
In all deference it is submitted that the majority have gotten
themselves into a position where they are simultaneously affirming contradictory propositions.
There is another aspect of this matter which leads to the same
conclusion. Mr. Metzler 5 says:
"Where an issue has been made by the pleadings which has
not been waived, and evidence on the subject, but not conclusive
in law, has been submitted, the failure of a party to contradict
the evidence produced is not an admission of the facts; for the
jury may not believe the evidence. And a charge to the jury
that such fact is uncontroverted and has been established is
prejudicial error."
Certainly it has been the general understanding of bench and
bar in this state that, in sustaining a party's motion for a directed
verdict, his own evidence cannot be considered, even though not
contradicted by the evidence of his opponent. That proposition
what every lawyer would say without hesitation, as a matter of everyday
common sense, namely, that the plaintiff was not called as a witness for the
defendant. It is true he could have been, but then, as Prof. Eddington points
out, if I put a saucepan of water on a fire tile water may freeze, although we
may safely affirm that it will boil "because it is too improbable that it should
do anything else". (The Nature of the Physical World, page 76.)
As a matter of fact the plaintiff was not called as a witness by the defendant.
This clearly appears from the brief in the supreme court on behalf of the defendant, the names of the witnesses called by the defendant being given therein.
Can anyone suppose that the court closed its eyes to this admission and decided the case on the hypothesis that the situation may possibly have been
other than it was known to have been in fact?
It is therefore submitted that the opinion in the Kukucz case cannot be
interpreted otherwise than as being contradictory of the scintilla rule.
44 Ohio St. 628, 647 (1855).
5

M'1TZLER, OHIo TRIAL EVIDENCE, p. 119.
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is not here defended. On the contrary, it appears to be unsound.
Nevertheless it has been adhered to until recently (save in one
situation to which reference will shortly be made), and is thoroughly consistent with the scintilla rule.
Under the scintilla rule "wherever there is any evidence, however slight, tending to prove the facts essential to make out a
case for the plaintiff, a non-suit cannot be properly ordered; it is
in no case a question as to the weight, but as to the relevancy of
the testimony".,
Can there be any doubt, then, that there is a
wide departure from the outlook and spirit of that rule in holding
that a party's own evidence may be made the basis of a directed
verdict in his favor? Yet that is exactly what the supreme court
did hold in the Kukucz case. "The missing evidence [that is,
the defendant's evidence] may have fully sustained the trial
court's ruling in directing the verdict."'
Under the scintilla rule, when considering a motion for a
directed verdict, the court can pass only upon the relevancy of
the evidence in the case offered by (or otherwise available to) the
party against whom the motion is directed. He cannot say that,
although relevant, the evidence does not possess sufficient weight
to justify submission to the jury. Yet, under the decision in the
Kukucz case, a trial judge may do the converse, that is, may
determine that a party's evidence (at least when not contradicted
by his opponent's evidence) is not only relevant but possesses
sufficient weight to require a directed verdict in his favor. Now
if the court cannot weigh the evidence of a party against whom a
directed verdict is asked and assay it to determine whether it has
sufficient probative value to submit to the Jury, how can the court
weigh the undisputed evidence of a party in whose favor a directed
verdict is asked and determine whether it has sufficient probative
value to require the court to grant the motion? It is submitted that
it is a logical impossibility.
In this respect, therefore, as in the other already considered,
the scintilla rule and the Kukucz case collide head-on. Both
cannot survive.
Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co., 4 Ohio St.- 628,
647 (18.55); Gibbs v. Village of Girard, 88 Ohio St. 34, 41, 43, 102 N. E 29'
(1913).

7See supra note 3.
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The propriety of directing a verdict in favor of a party on the
basis of his own undisputed evidence, under certain conditions,
would seem to be unquestionable. There is eminent authority
for it. Dean Wigmore, in his great work on Evidence,' says:
"That a verdict may also be directed for the proponent is
accepted by the majority of Courts, though it is more plausibly
open to dispute. The usual situation is that of a plaintiff who has
produced a mass of evidence sufficient to throw upon the defendant the liability of producing some evidence to the contrary,
and if this duty is not sustained, it is the judge's function to make
the decision. The only objection here can be that the judge
must not reach his decision by assuming the plaintiff's testimony
to be true (because that is the jury's province); yet where the
testimony is undisputed, or where in some other way that assumption is unnecessary, this objection disappears. A less common
situation is that of a defendant having an affirmative plea (for
example, payment of a note, or contributory negligence in personal injury): but here also a verdict may be orderedfor the defendant, provided the result can be reached upon undisputed testimony
of the defendant, or upon testimony of the plaintiff, which the latter
must concede to be true." (Italics ours.)
Even in this state it has been held proper if the party's evidence,
which is not contradicted, is exclusively documentary., But it
is clear that there can be no distinction in principle on that basis.
Ordinarily, perhaps, documentary evidence is more trustworthy
than that of witnesses on the stand. But documents may be
forged and altered, while oral testimony in open court is sometimes
convincing beyond the possibility of doubt.
The case of Aetna Life Insurance Company v.

Lembright, 10

decided by the court of appeals for Erie County, is directly in
point, particularly in view of the fact that the supreme court
overruled a motion to certify. That was an action on an employees' group life insurance policy terminable as to each insured
upon the cessation of his employment. It was defended on the
ground that the particular insured had ceased to be employed
prior to his death. To sustain this affirmative defense the
insurer introduced evidence, documentary and otherwise, to
show the cessation of employment. The evidence to this effect
85 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE
9

(2d ed. 1923), p. 461.

Kohl v. Hannaford, 5 Ohio Dec. Rep. 306 (1875).
1032 Ohio App. 10, 166 N. E. 586 (1928).
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was not rebutted by the plaintiff and defendant, therefore, moved
for a directed verdict. This was overruled and the case sent to
the jury, which found for the plaintiff. The court of appeals
held that, since the evidence of the defendant as to the termination of the employment was uncontradicted, it was error to overrule the motion for a directed verdict, and itself entered judgment
for the insurance company. The plaintiff thereupon filed a
motion to certify, which the supreme court overruled on June 19,
1928.
The considerations indicated in the opinion of the supreme
court in French v. Millard" effectively dispose of any contention
that a trial court must direct a verdict in favor of a party whenever his evidence is not contradicted. Trial courts should have
discretion to do so, however, and unless the Kukucz and Lentbright cases are overruled, they do have it now whatever may have
been thought formerly. If they are not overruled, the scintilla
rule has been destroyed.
The scintilla rule should be abandoned. 2 "To rest upon a
formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death."" Nor
should the doctrine of stare decisis call up misgivings. As Chief
Judge Cardozo says, "Hardly a rule of today but may be matched
by its opposite of yesterday.'' 4 Consider the impressive list of
overruled decisions in every jurisdiction. Within the last few
months the United States Supreme Court, in Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota,15 has added further proof that today is
not the helpless slave of yesterday. Our own supreme court,
when the occasion required, has not hesitated to do likewise. 6
There is here no question of vested rights-the court is free to
follow its own judgment.
JOSEPH O'MltARA, JR.
"12 Ohio St. 44 (1853).
I'See the author's note in

2 CIN. L. REV. 450 (1928).

3HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs, 306.
"CARDOZO,

TiE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 26.

1280 U. S. 204 (1930).
"The following are recent instances:

Trucson Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs

Furnace Co., 120 Ohio St. 394, 166 N. E. 368 (1929); The Commercial Credit
Co. v. Schreyer and Anderson v. Smith, 120 Ohio St. 568, 166 N. E. 808 (1929);
The State, eArrel. Automatic Registering Machine Co. v. Green, 121 Ohio St.
301, 168 N. E. 131 (1929).

